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This paper investigates how the destabilizing of a social network may increase the scope of network
externalities, using data on sales of a video-calling system made to an investment bank's employees
and subsequent usage by these customers. The terrorist attacks of 2001 led potential customers in New
York to start communicating with a new and less predictable set of people when their work teams
were reorganized as a result of the physical displacement that resulted from the attacks.  This did not
happen in other comparable cities. These destabilized communication patterns were associated with
potential adopters in New York being more likely to take into account a wider spectrum of the user
base when deciding whether to adopt relative to those in other cities. Empirical analysis suggests that
the aggregate effect of network externalities on adoption was doubled by this instability.
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This paper examines empirically the eect of instability in social networks on network
externalities, and therefore on the rate of adoption of technologies whose usage reects
these social networks. The eect of instability is not clear. On the one hand, instability
may make potential adopters more responsive to adoption by more users, because they
can no longer be reasonably certain they will not talk to them in the future. New
products and technologies may therefore be able to spread faster in contexts where
communications networks are unstable. On the other hand, instability may make
potential adopters less inclined to respond to adoption by anybody, because they are
more uncertain about their future communications patterns; this would mean that
unstable communications networks hinder the adoption of new technologies. Without
knowing the answer to this question, rms who wish to market new technologies that
exploit social networks may mishandle product launches through not understanding the
true scope of their product's network externalities, where `scope' describes how many
other people in the installed base inuences a potential adopter (Katz and Shapiro
1985).
To analyze the scope of network externalities under network instability, I use data
on the adoption of a video-calling technology sold by a business-to-business technology
developer to employees of an international investment bank. It is hard to establish a
causal link between communications network instability and the adoption rate. There
are many unobserved factors that could lead to both an unstable communications
structure and high or low adoption. For example, in a rm setting, poor management
could lead to both unstable communication patterns and employees who are unwilling
to adopt new technologies. Alternatively, a fast-paced work environment could lead
to both unstable communication patterns and employees who embrace cutting-edge
technologies. To address these identication problems, this paper uses an exogenous
shock to the stability of the communications network (the terrorist attacks of September
211, 2001), that forced the bank's teams in New York to be physically relocated and
reorganized, but did not aect the teams in other comparable cities. This shock led
New York employees to communicate with dierent people than they did before the
attacks, in a way which was dicult to predict. I study empirically whether this shock
to the communications network led to more or fewer people inuencing an adoption
decision.
Even with this exogenous shock to the communications network, it would still be
problematic to conclude that it was network externalities that prompted two employees
who communicate to adopt at the same time. Network externalities occur when the
performance of the good increases with the number of users. However, these two may
have adopted simultaneously because they shared similar external impulses to adopt
rather than because the usefulness of the good increased when they both adopted. To
identify network externalities, the paper uses the fact that the video-calling system can
also be used for watching TV. Some employees adopted the technology to watch one-
o regional TV events such as the 2002 Six Nations rugby championship. TV-inspired
adoption among employees' possible contacts varied across country and over time, even
for employees in a single city such as New York. The network externalities are then
measured based on how other employees responded to adoption by these TV-motivated
adopters.
Combining these identication techniques enables this research to highlight some
surprising ndings. Normally, potential adopters react to changes in the installed base
only if they communicate with that person in the month after they adopt. In other
words, network externalities appear to be highly localized. However, in New York
following the attacks, adoption by other related employees with whom adopters do not
actually communicate in the month after adoption had a signicant positive eect on
adoption decisions. This increase in the scope of network externalities means that the
importance of network externalities for adoption decisions doubles for those New York
customers aected by communications instability.
3This result contrasts with the established literature on the role of uncertainty in
technology adoption. One plausible explanation for the results is that network ex-
ternalities become less localized during periods of instability, because employees are
unsure about whom they will need to talk with in the future. Models of technology
diusion have usually treated unpredictability about usage as a hindrance to diusion
(Jensen 1982; Kalish 1985; Mahajan et al. 1990); we present new evidence that argues
for the opposite perspective when considering interactive technologies whose usefulness
depends on social networks. Along similar lines, consumer studies such as Castamo
et al. (2008), have treated consumer uncertainty over their future usage of a technology
as something that rms need to try to minimize. By contrast, in the case studied here,
instability made the adoption decision more responsive to a broader set of adoption
decisions. This was benecial, since it initiated further adoption cascades and nearly
wholly compensated for the base-level decrease in adoption associated with the attacks.
Katz and Shapiro (1985) emphasize that the scope of network externalities is just as
important as the size of the network externalities themselves, and that this scope may
vary. However, most current empirical research (Saloner and Shepard 1994; Brynjolfs-
son and Kemerer 1996; Gowrisankaran and Stavins 2004; Tucker 2008) has focused on
quantifying the size of network externalities and has taken the scope as xed. Following
the analysis of Shankar and Bayus (2003); Chang and Park (2005) who highlight dier-
ence in size of network externalities across rms, there have been some attempts to see
if the size of network externalities varies across rms individuals. Tucker (2008), which
uses the same data as the current paper, shows that for this good network externalities
were larger if an adopter was a manager or acted as a gatekeeper to other social net-
works. However, none of these studies quanties how uncertainty aects perceptions of
network externalities. Mobius (2001) and Puert (2002) emphasize the importance of
localness of networks in understanding network evolution, emphasizing that the growth
of a network changes network externalities as the localness of the customer base di-
minishes. This paper builds on this coordination literature by showing that it is not
4just the growth of the network that aects the role of network externalities, but also
the stability of the network.
From a managerial perspective, the results suggest that instability in communi-
cation networks may make it harder to coordinate the adoption of a new technology
whose usefulness is characterized by network interactions. This suggests that rms
need to adjust their strategies to reect network externalities more if networks are
unstable. If a rm were trying to encourage the adoption of a web-based video-calling
service, such as Skype, they would need to target incentives particularly at groups of
people who had less stable communications networks (students rather than seniors, for
example). My ndings may also help explain why network externalities have proved so
important for social networking sites such as Facebook: The younger demographic of
such web services is characterized by ever-changing and uid relationships, which mean
that potential users are inuenced by broader adoption rates in addition to adoption
by people who they are currently friends with.
The result that without network instability network externalities are highly local-
ized is also important for managers. Managers often assume that network externalities
for communications and social networking technologies depend on the total number of
subscribers. My estimates suggest, by contrast, that if networks are stable, only the
smaller subset of people with whom a potential adopter interacts plays a signicant
part in the adoption decision. If these results hold for other technologies, then network
externalities for network technologies with stable communications networks may be
limited in scope to predictable communications, reducing the extent to which initial
price cuts for such technologies are warranted. This limited scope for network exter-
nalities may also help explain ndings such as Tellis et al. (2009), that suggests that
product quality is more important than network externalities in explaining the success
of high tech products. If a rm only has to `tip' smaller communication clusters, there
may be less room for a long-run strategic advantage from network size.
52 Description of Technology and Data
2.1 Technology
Video-calling oers network benets because users can see the person they are talk-
ing to rather than just talking to them. This research studies a business-to-business
technology manufacturer's eorts to sell a new video-calling technology attached to an
employee's workstation to individual employees at an investment bank. The end-point
technology consists of three elements: video-calling software; a media compressor al-
lowing TV-quality video; and a camera xed on top of the computer's monitor. The
technology also has a stand-alone use of transforming the employee's desktop computer
into a television.
An unusual feature of the technology is that for data security reasons communica-
tion was limited to being between employees at the rm. This sets clear limits for the
potential network for each user.
2.2 Firm setting
After the bank chose this technology to allow its employees to conduct internal video-
calling and invested in the appropriate network architecture, the bank decentralized
installation decisions to each employee. The bank publicized the technology to employ-
ees and each employee decided whether and when to order a video-calling unit from an
external sales representative.1 The equipment's supplier had excess capacity, meaning
that capacity constraints did not aect the timing of individual employee installation
decisions. This decentralization means that I focus my analysis on the private benets
of installation for employees, as opposed to rm-wide decisions.
Though the price to employees was zero, there were still non-monetary costs. Inter-
views with employees at the rm conrmed that the most salient of these non-monetary
costs were the time they had to spend with their computer out of service while a tech-
1Only employees who had a position of Associate or higher were eligible, meaning that sta in secretarial
and support functions were not eligible.
6nician installed the video-calling unit and the time spent learning how to use it. This
cost was was generally viewed as high because they could not predict when they would
need to respond to rapid changes in the nancial markets. The installation required
the employee to be present so that the technician could demonstrate the product.
One obvious question is how well informed employees were about the spread of the
technology across the rm, since my economic analysis assumes that employees were
well-informed about who had adopted. When questioned, employees were most likely to
respond that they they learned about who else had the technology by asking a colleague
who had adopted the technology to look at the computer briey and examine the
electronic list of people who were on the network. The second most popular response
was that they gauged who had adopted the technology through emails where someone
suggested the use of the technology. Though the sample size for these interviews was
low, there were no obvious systematic dierences in how New York employees learned
about the spread of the technology compared to other employees after the attacks.
2.3 Data
A call database recorded the 2.4 million video-calls made within the bank from Jan-
uary 2001 to August 2004. For two-way video-calls, the database records the caller
and callee, the time the call was made, and the length of the call. Employees made
1,768,348 two-way user-to-user video-calls. The data include only the 1,052,110 video-
calls where the callee accepted the call and there was a non-zero time spent on the
call. Each accepted call lasted on average 5 minutes and 46 seconds. Calls could be
made to more than one employee at a time. Multi-party calls (less than 5% of the
calls) were simplied into their pairwise equivalents: Three-way calls were treated as
three calls between each two of the participants. The results are unchanged whether or
not these three-way calls are dropped or included in the sample, suggesting that they
do not drive the results. For one-way TV calls, the database records who made the
call, which TV channel was viewed, the time, and the length of the call. Employees
7made 741,926 successful one-way caller-to-media-device calls. Complete (anonymized)
personnel records describe every employee in the investment bank in March 2004. Em-
ployees were divided by function (administration, research, trading, and sales), region
(Britain, North America, Europe, and Asia/Sub-Equatorial, title (`Associate',`Vice-
President', `Director', and `Managing Director'. Managing Directors) and product
(equity and derivative) associated with two main products: equities and derivatives.2
These data were used both to evaluate when an employee makes a rst call and
`adopts' the technology and also to reconstruct the communications network within
the rm. The data only partially describe the communications network, because they
describe whom the 1,294 adopters video-called but not whom the 824 non-adopters
would have video-called if they had adopted. Therefore, non-adopters were excluded
from the regressions. Consequently, the empirical results are representative only of
adopters. They should be interpreted as reecting how network externalities aect the
adoption timing of adopters, as opposed to the decision to adopt for all employees.3
Further, it should be noted that these data fall short of an ideal dataset that might
include data from regular phone calls to dene an employee's communication circle.
Though the data span 3.5 years, my interest in the eect of instability means that I
focus on a limited time-frame of data which bridged the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001. I divide the data into January 2001{August 2001 (the `stable' period) and
October 2001{August 2002 (the `unstable' period). The choice of the `unstable' period
was based upon interviews with New York employees who said that this was how long
the period of upheaval to and uncertainty about their roles within the rm lasted after
the attacks.4 Using shorter windows such as 2 months before the attacks and 2 months
after the attacks provides directionally similar though less precise results. Table 1
2The data is identical to that used in Tucker (2008), which provides a slightly fuller description.
3Tucker (2008) compares predictions from studying adoption only by adopters and a predicted commu-
nications network that includes non-adopters. The results were similar.
4This is slightly longer than the period described by Bloom (2009) in his study of how multiple New
York-based industries recovered from the attacks, probably because this was a Wall Street rm and was
more directly aected.
8describes the summary statistics for major dependent and independent variables used
in the data.
[Table 1 about here.]
2.4 Physical dislocation
Like many rms based in New York, the investment bank had to physically relocate
their oces after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, in this case because their oce
close to the World Trade Center had to be evacuated due to the potential for structural
damage. This shift in physical location also led to a change in workgroup dynamics.
Management took the opportunity of the new oce space to reorganize teams to better
reect the new workspace. Typical of the relocation was that employees who had
previously sat in a workgroup that had analyzed `small-caps' or smaller rms, were now
reallocated to work with teams that analyzed particular industrial sectors. Similarly,
there were shifts in how derivatives traders were organized into teams depending on the
particular kind of bonds that they created derivatives for. The reorganization did not
lead to drastic changes, such as shifting people across functions from sales to trading,
but this did represent a genuine shift to group behavior. This physical relocation was
accompanied by employee uncertainty over how their roles would develop and change
within the rm and whether their new role would nd a place within the physical
reorganization. New York employees conrmed in interviews that they now called
dierent people as a result of the reorganization that followed the attacks, but that
they could have not initially have predicted who these people would have been.
It is crucial to establish whether there was indeed a shock to the communications
network empirically before moving on to the major analysis of paper which presupposes
this communications shock. Therefore in this section, I present some descriptive regres-
sions that explore the extent to which this occurred. This focus on repeated correlations
to illuminate relative stability, echo the work of Hagedoorn (1995) on rm-networks.
9These descriptive regressions compare the calling behavior of people who had adopted
the technology before the attacks in New York and elsewhere. This analysis uses a
Poisson specication, where the dependent variable is a count of the distinct employ-
ees each adopter talks to in each month. The key variable of interest is an interaction
term NYUnstable, which captures the eect of being based in New York rather than
elsewhere after the attacks. To control for observable and unobservable heterogene-
ity, controls for the month, region, title, and function of the employee as well as an
employee-level random eect were included.5
Table 2 displays this initial descriptive analysis. Column (1) shows that there was
no statistically signicant change in the raw number of other employees each adopter
spoke to in each month in New York after the attacks. Relative to other employees in
the `unstable' period, previous adopters in New York called the same number of people,
so there was no increase in aggregate use. Column (2) of Table 2 shows, however, that
there was an increase in the number of new people that an adopter in New York spoke
to in the period after the attacks, relative to other employees in other locations in the
rm.
Columns 3{5 of Table 2 explore the eect of NY  Unstable on the number of new
people that an employee talks to in dierent workgroups, functions, product groups,
and global markets. The insignicance of NYUnstable in columns 3{5 indicates that
the new people that New York employees talked to in the period after the attacks were
from similar functions, product groups, and global markets. The fact that these new
calls were not placed outside the function, product group and market helps to guide
the denition of `potential contacts', the group of employees that an employee may
have talked to, in my main empirical analysis of technology adoption.
These results suggest that employees in New York called more new people follow-
ing the attacks relative to employees in other cities, though these new contacts were
in the same function, product group and market. In the remainder of this paper I
5Specications that included employee-level xed eects had similar results.
10investigate whether this change in underlying communication patterns mattered for
new technology adoption decisions.
[Table 2 about here.]
3 Modeling Technology Adoption
This analysis suggests that communication patterns in New York were destabilized
by the attacks while those in other cities were not. To understand how this aects
technology adoption behavior, I model potential customer technology adoption at the
individual level. This is a latent variable setting, where only installation decisions
instit, not installation benets inst











it = (ExpectedCallsit;StandAloneBenetsit) (1)
Each month, each potential customer chooses whether or not to install the tech-
nology. As described in Farrell and Klemperer (2007), adoption depends on both the
network benet that a customer expects to receive from making video-calls and the
stand-alone value that the potential customer receives from the technology, indepen-
dent of whether they use it to make video-calls. This is a net stand-alone benet
that, besides reecting the TV-watching capacity of the device, also reects that non-
monetary adoption costs are high for that customer. I discuss my conception of each
in turn.
`Network externality,' is a term used by social scientists to describe a broad class
of phenomena. These include `bandwagon-eects' and other types of informational
11spillovers, as well as direct technological complementarity where the usefulness of a
network good (such as a fax machine or video-calling unit) depends on other users
also having it. Since the data used in this study are for a classic network technology,
my initial interpretation and analysis concentrates on technological complementarity
as the source of network externalities.
The number of calls that a customer expects to be able to benet from on depends
on three factors. First, the number of other customers that potential customer i would
call if that person also adopted. There are two potential sets of people that a potential
customer i may call fC;Pg. C is the set of customers, whom i thinks they are very
likely to call because they are already close-knit contacts. P is the customers that there
is some chance that the employee might call, that is, merely potential contacts. The
second factor is whether another customer j (either in set C or P) has also adopted
the video-calling technology. The last factor is the probability k2fc;pg that employee





instj  c +
X
j2Pi
instj  p (2)
In some circumstances, customer i may be able to predict very well whom they will
talk with. In such stable circumstances, they may be able to ascribe a probability of
c close to one for a subset of their closest collaborators, and an p close to 0 for other
potential contacts. If future communication patterns are less certain, that is there is
network instability, however, a customer i may ascribe a higher probability p to the
likelihood of calling one of these potential contacts, as they are less certain that they
will talk only with their closest collaborators.
123.1 Applying the model to data
The dependent variable instit is whether the employee used video-calling technology to
make an outward call for the rst time in that month. This allows me to pinpoint the
actual timing of adoption, because one of the protocols that the installation technician
followed was to make an outward test-call as soon as they installed the technology on
the employee's laptop. In all instances, this outward call was the rst video-calling
activity observed for the employee.
To operationalize the split between C people and P people for each employee i with
observable customer behavior in the data, I construct two mutually exclusive groups
for each employee. The C group, Contactsi, are the other employees that i actually
did talk to in the month after their adoption. The P group, Potentialsi, are those
employees the customer did not talk to in the month following adoption but that there
was a chance that they could have talked to as they shared the same product area,
function or market specialization.
This denition of Potentialsi is based on the empirical analysis in Table 2, which
suggests that existing users contacted more new employees, but that these new con-
tacts were not outside their function, market specialization, or product group. In ad-
dition to the evidence from the communication patterns of early adopters, the choice
of these particular (reasonably broad) characteristics to dene potential contacts was
supported by interviews with investment bankers that suggested that it is very unusual
for employees to switch from investment banking to equity sales or from researching
Asian equities to researching European derivatives, since an employee has built up
employee-specic expertise in that area. Therefore, even in view of the dislocation and
uncertainty caused by the terrorist attacks, it seems likely that an employee would still
perceive their broad product area as being the set of people in the rm they were most
likely to communicate with.
Basing my measures for ExpectedCallsit on the subsequent month after adoption
13presumes very high discount rates. However, this short time frame is necessary to
ensure comparability. It ensures that when I compare the inuences of adoption before
the attacks and after the attacks, I am using the same measure of the putative installed
base.6
I model that the extent to which adoption by Contactsi and Potentialsi will matter
depends on the stability of the underlying communications network. If communications
are predictable, employees should be able to better anticipate whom their Contactsi
are, or in other words ascribe a high c and a low p, and respond only to adoption
by Contactsi and not to Potentialsi. However, if communications are not predictable,
employees may also anticipate that they could talk to Potentialsi whom they do not
call, and as a result they will ascribe a higher p and a lower c relative to a stable
network.
The installed base for Contactsi is captured by InstalledContactsit. This installed
base is a count of all contacts' installation decisions up to and including month t.
The count of adoption by Potentialsi who have adopted the technology, but with
whom the employee did not communicate in the month after adoption, is captured
by InstalledPotentialsit. I assume that each employee i takes the adoption choices of
other employees as given, that is, that employees do not anticipate that their adoption
could aect others' adoption in the future.7 Employees did not divest themselves of the
technology after it was attached to their desktops. Therefore, I treat adoption decisions
as permanent, and include only observations where the employee adopts video-calling
in that month or has not yet adopted when estimating adoption decisions. This means
an observation is an employee who did not adopt the technology in the previous months
but does ultimately adopt.
In order to capture the stand-alone benet of the technology, I use a rich set of
6I cannot, for example, use the nal year of data to establish stable communication patterns for all
adopters, because as illustrated in Table 2, these communication patterns were not predictable for those who
adopted before the attacks.
7See Ryan and Tucker (2008); Dube et al. (2010) for a formal equilibrium model.
14largely non-parametric controls. It is likely that the net costs of adopting the technology
vary across employees. For example, it may be easier for employees in more exible
areas, such as research, to schedule time for their computers to be down than for
employees who work in fast-paced areas, such as derivatives trading. Such heterogeneity
is captured using a series of controls for each employee Xi. These include indicator
variables for each of the dierent functions, product groups, regions, and titles. A series
of dummies was also used for each month that employees could potentially adopt the
technology, Tt. Since these time dummies will also pick up selection and the changing
baseline hazard rate, they cannot be interpreted, and instead serve to capture the
varying underlying hazard rate in a exible manner (Jenkins 1995).
This technology also had specic benets that were independent of any network
usage. In particular, employees enjoyed being able to watch television on their desk-
top computer. There were two types of television employees could watch: News TV
programming on CNN and CNBC, which covers nancial news; and local TV pro-
gramming (often non-news) broadcast by country-specic channels. There was little
variation across regions in the percentage of adopters watching news programming
(implying that this is largely captured by the month dummies), but there was large
variation in employee interest in local TV programming across regions.8 For example,
many employees in the UK watched the 2002 Six Nations rugby championship, while
employees in the US did not. Empirically, these local broadcast events were corre-
lated with adoption in the month prior to the month they occur. This suggests that
employees adopted the technology in advance to ensure they could watch predictable
`must-see' television.9 These regional shocks to the technology's stand-alone benet
were captured by the variable TVrt, which contains the percentage of previous adopters
8The focus here was on the viewing habits for local television as the instrument. Local channels for Europe
were ZDF (German), ARD (German), Kanal (Swedish), ORF (Austria), and Eurosport. Local channels for
Britain were ITV, SkySports, Channel 4, and the BBC. Local channels for the US were CSPAN, FOX, NBC,
and CBS. Local channels for Asia were NTV (Nippon TV), CATS (Japanese), TV-Asia, and BBC 24 World
Service.
9In the UK, over 60% of users watched television at the time of the World Cup soccer matches.
15watching `local TV' in region r in the month following time t. The video-calling unit's
TV use led to a less systematic pattern of adoption than is common for communication
technologies. For example, there is no statistically signicant relationship between how
many months after the launch date the adopter adopts the technology, and the number
of people a new adopter calls or the length of time they spend on video-calling.




+ 2InstalledPotentialsit + TVr;t + Xi + !Tt + itjStabilityit) (3)
To summarize: Installation decisions are modeled as depending on the installed
base of Contactsi and Potentialsi, the stand-alone TV benet, their own idiosyncratic
net benets captured by controls Xi, a series of controls for month-by-month changes
in their underlying hazard rate Tt, and unobserved heterogeneity (it). I estimate this
specication with a probit in a discrete hazard model framework (Jenkins 1995; Tellis
et al. 2009).10
4 Correlations In The Data
To investigate the eects of the shock to the communication networks on adoption, I
compare adoption behavior in the New York oces to adoption behavior in non-New
York oces before and after the attacks. As with any dierence-in-dierences approach,
the identifying assumption is that the New York oce, in the absence of the physical
relocation, would have had the same change in responsiveness to the installed base as
employees in other cities. There was no statistically signicant relationship between an
employee working in New York and their number of contacts (see Table 2). However,
New York employees talk less on average to employees in dierent cities. Employees
10The direction and signicance of the coecients in the probit specication are similar to those obtained
from a Cox-proportional hazards model.
16attributed this to limitations imposed by the time dierence between the New World
and Old World and did not think that this propensity changed in the period studied.
Table 3 presents the results of running the specication represented by equation (3)
separately for before and after the attacks and for New York and non-New York em-
ployees.
[Table 3 about here.]
As documented by Manski (1993), measures such as InstalledContactsit and InstalledPotentialsit
are plagued by the reection problem, making any causal interpretation of correlations
in adoption problematic. Instead, the aim of Table 3 is to compare the extent of
correlation between adoption and actual/potential contacts' adoption for New York
employees before and after the attacks relative to employees elsewhere. Subsequently,
instrumental variables are used to identify actual network externalities.
There are some suggestive shifts in the correlations. Both New York and non-New
York employees before 9/11 only exhibit positive and signicant correlation in adoption
with their `actual contacts'. However, after 9/11, New York employees no longer have
a statistically signicant correlation in adoption with their actual contacts, but instead
have a statistically signicant correlation in adoption with their potential contacts.
Non-New-York employees' adoption, by contrast, continues to be correlated only with
their actual contacts. These results are robust to whether I use the total number of
potential contacts adopting (as I do in Table 3), or the percentage of potential contacts
adopting.11 This fact that whether I use percentage or absolute numbers for potential
contacts does not matter suggests that these correlations are not driven by the eect
of employee group size.
In order to test whether the coecients on InstalledContactsit and InstalledPotentialsit
for New York employees are statistically dierent to those outside New York before
11The proportion of actual contacts that have adopted is always reasonably close to one because a contact
necessarily has adopted the technology by month t+1, meaning that it is not very instructive to use it as a
regressor.
17and after the attacks, I ran a three-way dierences-in-dierences specication. Fol-
lowing the economics literature, this dierences-in-dierences specication captures
relative changes in the time trend for dierent groups of employee by the use of
three-way interactions and panel data. The results are reported in Table 5. The
coecients on the three-way interactions InstalledContactsit  NYi  Unstablet and
InstalledPotentialsit  NYi  Unstablet are signicantly dierent from zero, suggesting
that there was a statistically meaningful change (p<0.05) in adoption responsiveness for
New York employees after the attacks.
5 Measuring network externalities
Table 3 suggests that employees in New York were more likely to adopt when a wide
circle of their acquaintances adopted the technology after the attacks, compared to
before and to other comparable employees. Correspondingly, Table 2 suggests that
employees called more new people after the attacks. However, while suggestive, these
two pieces of evidence do not prove that the changes in correlations in adoption can be
ascribed to anticipated changes in calling behavior due to the potential for unobserved
heterogeneity (Manski 1993). Consider two employees who are both encouraged to
install the technology by their New York boss who is concerned about aviation safety
after the attacks; a clear identication strategy is needed to avoid interpreting the
subsequent correlation in their adoption decisions as a causal network externality.
I use variation in the TV-viewing benet of the technology as an instrumental
variable to identify how changes in the installed base causally aect an employee's
adoption. This exploits three types of variation in the data: Regional variation in the
benet of watching TV; time variation in the benet of watching TV; and variation
in the regions in which employees have contacts or potential contacts. The instrument
for actual contacts for employee i is
Pi
j2C(TVr;t), or the average TV benet (TVr;t)
for each actual contact j's region r at month t. The instrument for potential contacts
for employee i is
Pi
j2P(TVr;t), or the average TV benet (TVr;t) for each potential
18contact j's region r at month t.
The value of these instruments varies over time and by the regions these contacts
and potential contacts work in. Crucially, the instrument for the New York oce for
potential contacts also has considerable variation in the data. This is because the
variety of dierent functions, product markets and market specializations means that
there were at least 48 dierent viable sets of potential contacts for any one employee in
the New York oce. Not all earlier adoptions by i's actual or potential contacts were
counted as necessarily causing i's installation. Instead, the research uses variation in
adoption by i's contacts or potential contacts that can be predicted by variation in
the stand-alone (TV) benet. In all specications, the joint F-test of the rst-stage
regressions was signicant at the 0.01 level.
One concern is that employees who had contacts in a region that had heavy TV-
watching might be dierent in unobserved ways from similar employees who did not
have contacts in that region. To rule out such challenges to the exclusion restriction,
I ran multiple regressions examining whether there were signicant dierences in the
observable correlates of having contacts in a particular region. Except for a relationship
with the global market area that an employee worked in, there was no statistically
signicant dierence between employees who had dierent regional concentrations of
contacts in terms of their observable characteristics, TV-watching or network use.
Table 4 displays the estimates for this instrumented version of equation (3). The
rst two columns display results for the `stable' pre-period before September 2001.
They suggest that for both New York and other nancial centers, the eect of actual
contacts adopting was signicant while the eect of potential contacts was insignicant.
After September 2001, the `unstable' period, employees in New York reacted dier-
ently to adoption by other employees in other locations. For New York employees, the
potential installed base now exerts a positive inuence on adoption. Potential adopters
who are not based in New York, however, still do not react to the potential installed
base. For both New York and non-New York employees, the estimated network exter-
19nalities for the inuence of actual contacts decrease. In the case of New York, they
become statistically insignicant at conventional levels with a p-value of 0.11, though
the point estimate is still higher that for InstalledPotentialsi. This suggests that there
was increased variance on the extent to which employees in New York responded to
adoption by their actual contacts, which would again t an explanation whereby New
York employees became less sure about whom they would talk to after the attacks.
The fact that TV viewing is positive and signicant in the unstable period outside of
New York reects the relative degree of interest in the World Cup outside of the US in
2002 (as documented by Tucker (2008).
[Table 4 about here.]
In order to test the dierence in magnitude of the coecients in Table 4, I repeated
the regression using a pooled sample. The main variables of interest are the three-
way interactions, InstalledPotentialsit NYi Unstablet and InstalledContactsit NYi 
Unstablet. These measure the dierential eect on the installed base of the relocation of
the New York oces. Therefore, the dierences-in-dierences specication of equation
(3) becomes:
inst
it = 1InstalledContactsit + 2InstalledPotentialsit
+ 3InstalledContactsit  NYi  Unstablet + 4InstalledPotentialsit  NYi  Unstablet
+ (Unstablet  NYi + InstalledContactsit  NYi + InstalledPotentialsit  NYi
+ InstalledContactsit  Unstablet + InstalledPotentialsit  Unstablet)
+ TVr;t + Xi + !Tt + it (4)
The level eects of Unstablet and NYi are captured by the vector of time dummies
and location dummies (Xi).
[Table 5 about here.]
20Column (1) of Table 5 presents the results for all employees without IV. Column
(2) presents the results using instrumental variables. The instruments are the average
TV benet for an employees' actual and potential contacts and appropriate weights to
reect the endogenous interactions. They key variables of interest are the three-way in-
teractions InstalledContactsitNYiUnstablet and InstalledPotentialsitNYiUnstablet.
Though precise estimation is problematic in a regression with eight endogenous vari-
ables, the interaction for InstalledPotentialsit  NYi  Unstablet was positive and sig-
nicant (p<.10). New York showed no change in responsiveness to the installed base of
their contacts, but the adoption of employees in New York became increasingly cor-
related with the measure of the installed base of potential contacts in the rm after
the attacks. The coecient on InstalledContactsit  NYi  Unstablet was not, however,
signicantly dierent from zero, suggesting there was no measurable change in how
New York employees responded to adoption by employees they called in the month
after they adopted. Other variables are much in line with past evidence. There are
positive correlations between adoption and the narrow installed base InstalledContacts.
The negative coecient on Unstable  InstalledContacts may reect the fact that later
adopters were in general less responsive to adoption by others than earlier adopters.
To address concerns about the reliability of the Probit-IV model when there are
multiple dummy variables and interaction terms (Ai and Norton 2003), I also estimated
a linear probability model. The estimates are very similar, with a slight increase in
signicance, especially for the installed base of actual contacts.
5.1 Robustness and discussion
The major nding in Tables 4 and 5 is that New York employees became more likely
to adopt if their broader group of potential contacts adopted, relative to employees in
other cities. The interpretation that this paper has highlighted so far is that when com-
munication patterns are more unstable, potential adopters take into account adoption
by a wider group of network users. However, there are other potential explanations,
21which I now discuss in turn.
The rst set of alternative explanations are concerned with unobservable hetero-
geneity. The identifying assumption underlying these results is that New York em-
ployees would have had a similar change in their adoption patterns to non-New York
employees if it had not been for the attacks. However, there may be concerns that
changes in communication in general after 9/11 can provide an alternative explana-
tion for what occurred, and that these changes may have had a larger eect in New
York than in cities such as Hong Kong that were far away from the attacks. For ex-
ample, perhaps concerns over increased security measures in airports led New York
employees to anticipate using the technology more broadly. To alleviate such concerns,
I reran the regressions from Table 4 for employees in the London oce. These were
the closest employees to the New York oce, both in terms of the economy of the
country they operated in and the cultural practices of the rm. London itself was
considered at the time to be a reasonably likely location for a terrorist attack, though
an attack did not occur there until July 7, 2005. Since both countries participated in
the war in Afghanistan, both sets of employees experienced similar changes to their
previous air-travel patterns and airport security measures. Both economies' nancial
sectors experienced similar declines as a result of the attacks. However, the eect of
InstalledPotentialsit was both insignicant and negative for London employees, sug-
gesting that the broadening of scope of network externalities was exclusive to the New
York oce which experienced the actual physical reorganization. Furthermore, the
communication patterns of existing adopters did not display the shift shown in Table
2.
Another interpretation of the positive coecient on InstalledPotentials after the at-
tacks is that it reects a dierent kind of network eect from those associated with the
complementarity of video-calling technology. For example, it could reect an increase
in bandwagon eects or informational spillovers. This is a plausible interpretation if
after 9/11 New York employees were more likely to mimic their neighbor's adoption
22due to an increase in sensitivity to other people's actions. To study this interpreta-
tion further, I examined whether there was any increase in correlations in adoption
between one employee and other employees on the same oor as them. If informational
spillovers or bandwagon eects were important, it would seem likely that they would be
most concentrated amongst people who had daily physical contact. However, I found
no statistically signicant change in the relationship between New York employees'
adoption and their physically close colleagues' adoption before and after the attacks.
Back-of-the-envelope estimates allow a comparison of the overall eect of network
externalities for New York employees after the attacks compared with other employ-
ees. There is no eect that can be measured accurately from actual contacts for New
York employees. An average New York employee after the attacks had 102 potential
contacts. The marginal eect of the potential installed base of 0.0004, based on the
probit estimates in table 4, therefore suggests that the average New York employee re-
ceived a boost in their adoption propensity of around 4% from their potential contacts
(0.0004 x 102). To put this boost into context, the average adoption propensity is 8%
each month. By contrast, the average non-New York employee, who has nine actual
contacts installed after the attacks, receives a boost of 2% from the marginal eect of
the coecient of 0.0021 on actual contacts (0.0021 x 9). There is no eect that can be
measured accurately for potential contacts. Therefore, roughly, network externalities
were twice as important for adoption for New York employees after the attacks than
for employees elsewhere.
This is a marginal boost to adoption. As suggested by the negative probit coecient
on UnstableNY in Table 5 that translates to a marginal eect of  0:0275, on average
the level of adoption in New York after the terrorist attacks was slightly lower (around
1% in the raw data). This is in line with traditional theories of how instability or
uncertainty aects investment. There are of course other explanations too, such as
employees having more spare time to spend acquiring the technology as business volume
went down after the attacks. What is novel is that the increased scope of network
23externalities from the broader installed base nearly compensates for this decrease in
the base level of adoption during this time of instability.
Also striking is that in Table 4 is the persistently null result for the eect of
InstalledPotentialsit for the majority of employees (87.5 % of the sample) who either
adopted before the attacks or were not based in New York. This null result is impor-
tant in two ways. First, it suggests that broader network externalities in the form of
informational spillovers and bandwagons were not that important for the adoption of
this technology, since it seems likely that if these were present they would be reected
in a correlation in adoption between an employee and other employees similar to him.
Second, it suggests that network externalities due to the complementarity of technolo-
gies such as video-calling are limited to smaller subsets of network users who actually
communicate if network relationships are reasonably stable.
6 Implications
This paper nds that when social networks were stable, adoption cascades for a new
network technology were conned to small subsets of people who interacted with each
other. However, when the communications network became less stable, potential
adopters looked more broadly at the network and were more responsive to adoption
by a broader circle of potential contacts. These empirical results are based on the
destabilization of a communication network due to the terrorist attacks in 2001 for a
subset of potential users.
This nding is important for managers trying to introduce new products. Both
managerial practice and the academic literature have assumed that unpredictability
in usage for a new product deters consumers from adopting new technology (Jensen
1982; Kalish 1985; Mahajan et al. 1990; Castamo et al. 2008). By contrast, the ndings
here suggest that if there are network externalities and there is uncertainty over usage
patterns, an adoption decision may become responsive to a broader set of adoption
decisions. This increase in the scope of network externalities led to a doubling of their
24role in adoption decisions.
This research also underscores that for many technologies where communication and
social networks are stable, network externalities are extremely local and only depend
on the people that a person directly communicates with (Sundararajan 2007). This
may undercut marketing strategies for network products that are based on a `winner
takes all' mentality. It may also explain research such as Tellis et al. (2009) that has
found that network externalities are less important for technology diusion that other
product features such as quality.
From a managerial perspective, my results suggest that instability may make it
harder for rms to spread new technologies for which network externalities could theo-
retically be important. If the network is stable, and interactions are small and localized,
managers are unlikely to need to adjust their marketing strategically to take network
externalities into account. However, if the network is unstable, and interactions may
not be predictably localized, managers should be very active in targeting promotions
to kick-start network growth. For example, managers at Skype would ideally target
incentives toward groups of people, like students, whose communications networks are
relatively unstable. These ndings help to explain why the social networking sites that
have grown fastest are ones like MySpace and Facebook, which are targeted towards
young people who have ever-changing and uid social relationships. This instability
means that potential users are inuenced by broader adoption rates as well as only
adoption by people they are currently friends with.
There are of course limitations to this research. I study the eect of instability of
communications within a specic business-to-business setting. Therefore, I can only
speculate how these results translate to direct consumer markets. Further, the nature
of the uncertainty in this particular context was unusual in that it was particularly
salient. The employees knew that as a result of re-organization that their communica-
tion patterns would change - they just did not know whom they would talk to. The
eect of uncertainty might be more muted if the fact that interactions may be uncer-
25tain was less salient. However, notwithstanding these limitations, my research does
suggest that uncertainty can change the inuence that network externalities have on
adoption decisions, and that recognition of this should be reected both in academic
models and in managerial practice.
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28Table 1: Description of all variables used in regressions
Before Attacks After Attacks
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent Variables
instit Indicator variable for the rst month an
employee makes outward video-call
0.112 .3157 .046 0.209
Right-hand Side Variables
InstalledContactsit Sum of cumulative adoption by employee
i's contacts by month t, where contacts
are the employees in the rm that the em-
ployee talks to in the month after they
adopt.
8.086 9.080 8.523 10.109
InstalledPotentialContactsit Sum of cumulative adoption by employee
i's potential contacts who work in the
same function, product, and global mar-
ket area but whom the employee did not
contact in the month after they adopt
68.511 31.316 111.133 45.458
TVrt Proportion of adopters in the employee's
region r who have adopted prior to month
t who watch local television channels in
month t + 1
0.249 0.345 0.393 0.374
Controls for regions Indicator variables for Europe, Asia, US,
and UK
Controls for month Indicator variables for each month from
February 2001 to August 2002
Controls for function Dummies for working in administration,
research, trading, and sales
Total Observations 12,723
29Table 2: Preliminary analysis exploring number of new people that employees who adopted





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
NY  Unstable 0.005 0:184  0:068 0.045 0.035
(0.038) (0.105) (0.102) (0.106) (0.087)
NY  0:008  0:175 0.025  0:055  0:154
(0.129) (0.137) (0.143) (0.138) (0.121)
Unstable 0.063 0.008 0.028  0:011 0.184
(0.057) (0.160) (0.160) (0.172) (0.134)
Observations 34,125 34,125 34,125 34,125 34,125
Log-likelihood  3:35  104  1:26  104  1:18  104  1:18  104  1:63  104
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Title Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Function Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample: Employees who adopted video-calling prior to September 2001.
Poisson specication. No zeros dependent variables observed in the data. Poisson goodness of t 2 statistic suggested that
the hypothesis data were dispersed according to the Poisson distribution could not be rejected at the 5 percent level. Random
eects at employee level. p < 0:1, p < 0:05, p < 0:01.
30Table 3: Correlations between Employee's Own Adoption and Potential and Actual Contacts'
Adoption
Stable Period Unstable Period
NYC Not NYC NYC Not NYC
InstalledContacts 0.0419*** 0.0316*** 0.0117 0.0201***
(0.0065) (0.0040) (0.0075) (0.0040)
InstalledPotentials 0.0010 -0.0024 0.0057** 0.0009
(0.0036) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0015)
TV-Watching 0.4482 0.1151 0.0054 0.6067***
(0.3808) (0.1643) (0.4572) (0.1828)
Observations 1294 3654 1171 3248
Log-Likelihood -372.13 -1054.58 -171.10 -586.26
Month Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region, Title, Function Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable: Indicator for when an employee rst makes an outward video-call
Sample: Adopters who have not yet made a video-call. 2,506 observations dropped due to multi-collinearity with xed eects.
Probit Specication. Clustered standard errors at the work-group level.
p < 0:10, p < 0:05, p < 0:014.
Stable period is January 2001{August 2001 and unstable period is October 2001{August 2002
31Table 4: Probit specication with instrumental variables
Stable Period Unstable Period
New York Non-New York New York Non-New York
InstalledContacts 0:0389 0:0325 0.0162 0:0174
(0.0077) (0.0040) (0.0100) (0.0045)
InstalledPotentials 0.0016  0:0003 0:0060  0:0004
(0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0036) (0.0016)
TV viewing  0:3807 0.0676  0:0430 0:7402
(0.2984) (0.1558) (0.3977) (0.2126)
Observations 1,383 4,017 1,276 3,541
Month Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region, Title, Function Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dependent Variable: Indicator for whether an employee rst makes an outward video-call that month
Sample: Employees who ultimately adopt the technology who have not yet made a video-call. 850 additional observations
dropped from sample used in Table 3 due to collinearity.
Probit two-step Newey estimates: p < 0:10, p < 0:05, p < 0:01
Instruments for the dierent installed base measures are the TV valuation of each employee's actual and potential contacts.
First-stage regressions signicant at 1% level. Regression is exactly identied.
Stable period is January 2001{August 2001 and unstable period is October 2001{August 2002
32Table 5: Hypothesis testing using three-way di-in-di
All Employees All Employees (IV)
Unstable  NY  InstalledContacts -0.0041 -0.0037
(0.0038) (0.0097)






Unstable  NY -0.4976*** -0.5371*
(0.0802) (0.2796)
NY  InstalledContacts 0.0056** 0.0061
(0.0023) (0.0057)
Unstable  InstalledContacts -0.0153*** -0.0142***
(0.0033) (0.0045)
NY  InstalledPotentials -0.0006 -0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0011)
Unstable  InstalledPotentials -0.0001 -0.0011
(0.0012) (0.0015)
TV viewing 0.2915*** 0.2983***
(0.0960) (0.0961)
Observations 10217 10217
Month Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Region, Title, Function Controls Yes Yes
Dependent Variable: Indicator for whether an employee rst makes an outward video-call that month
Sample: Employees who ultimately adopt the technology who have not yet made a video-call
Column (1) displays Probit estimates. Column (2) displays Probit two-step Newey estimates: p < 0:10, p < 0:05,
p < 0:01
Instruments for column (2) the dierent installed base measures are the TV valuation of each employee's actual and potential
contacts interacted with Unstable and New York Indicator variables. First-stage regressions signicant at 1% level. Regression
is exactly identied.
Stable period is January 2001{August 2001 and unstable period is October 2001{August 2002
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